

DATE: 7 Nov 73

TO: The NIO's

FROM: GACarver, Jr.

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

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Attached is a comment on the "New Family" memorandum prepared by [redacted] as indicated in his covering note. Bureau-cratically, I have taken the position that I will not either associate myself with these comments or dissent from them because I do not want to express this office's views until I have had a chance to consult with all of you and that given the course of the past day's events, we have not yet been able to focus on this problem. I would like to discuss it at our staff meeting next Wednesday (14 November)

[redacted]
George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO

Attachment

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7 November 1973

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: CIA Comments on a Proposed Family of
National Intelligence Products

1. The production strategy outlined in this proposal has one valuable central idea, one glaring central weakness, and a number of subsidiary points of varying merit.

2. The *valuable central idea* is that the community should be equipped to produce more of its intelligence in a national form. The proposal occasionally pushes this idea too far; given the uneven capabilities throughout the community on such topics as economics and non-military science coordination would be more trouble than it was worth. Nevertheless, it is a valid criticism to assert that the community receives too much unilateral and overlapping material, particularly in crisis situations.

3. The *glaring central weakness* is the proposal's silence on direction. Who initiates a National Watch or Bulletin? Who exercises quality control? Who is empowered

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to reject proposals on trivial matters to keep from flooding the system? The same questions apply with equal force to the National Analysts Summary, the National Intelligence Bulletin, and the National Intelligence Weekly.

4. If we discard the naive assumption that all these systems will operate spontaneously, there seems only one answer. In every case, control would have to be vested in the representatives of the DCI, to whom the President has made it plain that he looks for coordination production. This is so self-evident that it seems a dubious tactic to leave it out of the proposal in hopes that the other agencies won't notice.

5. Moreover, while this proposal pays lip service to the other publications of CIA and the community, the spirit is clearly to sweep them from the board and start virtually from the ground up. There may be virtues in this kind of shock treatment; if we consider, however, the number of other changes being introduced into the community it would seem far better to use existing mechanics, modifying them wherever possible rather than junking them. The idea that both a new family of products and the old family can be simultaneously supported by our analytical assets when a kind of competition goes on is not workable, either from the producers' or the customers' viewpoint.

Some Specific Issues

6. *NOIWON and the NWOB.* It would be a mistake to include the White House Situation Room in NOIWON. The White House is a consumer and should not be flooded with raw intelligence in a crisis. What is needed are two products, a Draft National Watch Officers Bulletin and a NWOB. The DNWOB could be initiated by any member of NOIWON and would constitute a report plus a request for confirmation or additional information. After responses have circulated within the system, CIA--for an NIOC under the DCI--should coordinate and send to the WHSR an NWOB, or reject the DNWOB on grounds of error or triviality.

7. The suggestion (p. 14) that NIOWON/NOIAN would provide for an input of operational information poses serious problems. It is not reasonable to expect that the results of high-level and necessarily delicate negotiations would be fed into such a system, nor is it likely that JCS military operational plans could be revealed for discussion among intelligence analysts. Not only are there security problems, but we would run the risk that our use of this information would be perceived as a possible attempt to influence or formulate policy. This could be dangerous to the integrity of the community itself.

8. *NOIAN and the NAS.* This is the least clear part of the proposal, as exemplified in the mystifying statement on page 18 that "other events" would have generated 39 Summaries in March 1973. What does seem clear, however, is that the consumers, in crisis periods, need more frequent and timely coordinated summaries and analysis than those provided by a scheduled daily. This would seem to call for coordinated sitreps, which in theory could be produced in the proposed National Intelligence Operations Center. In practice, however, we have found that coordinating sitreps under pressure is not possible, even within our own house, if it involves getting the "chop" from the various chiefs. It is possible in practice to solicit and accept contributions from outside the immediate group producing the sitrep, and making use of "all the talents" in this way is not only feasible but highly desirable. But the community cannot afford to subordinate the timely production of information and spot analysis on "how the crisis is going" to coordination considerations.

9. *The Relationship between NWOB and NAS.* The proposal is too schematic in the sharp distinction drawn between factual reporting and analysis in time of crisis, and in its aversion to any scheduled production. Our experience in a host of crises, including the 1973 Middle

Eastern war, is that consumers do not want a stream of separate items throughout the day and night. They find the Situation Report format highly convenient as a means of pulling together developments and adding analysis. This should not--indeed, does not--prohibit the immediate reporting, out of schedule, of truly key new items. But three or four Sitreps a day, as opposed to an irregular stream of small items--some factual, some analytic--fits their consumption habits much better.

10. *The National Intelligence Daily*. This is a good idea, and we propose its immediate adoption, independently of the other proposals. We are prepared to drop or modify the Central Intelligence Bulletin, to accept drafts originated by other agencies, to encourage more active participation in coordination, and to welcome statements of dissent. We would expect the principles of CIA Chairmanship (paragraphs 2 and 3) to apply.

11. *The National Intelligence Weekly*. Here is another good idea. In defining it more specifically, we suggest that it focus on matters of clear significance to US interests which may require policy actions within several weeks, rather than on the more eclectic approach of the Current Intelligence Weekly Review. It can be thought of as an expansion of the

Watch Report that would look a bit further forward and cover political and economic as well as military problems which, if they occur, could be expected to require a US response at a high level. It could readily be produced using a modified Watch Committee/NIC structure.

12. *The NIEs, SNIEs, and NIAMs.* The proposal does not seem to call for any change in these products, although the NIAM examples in paragraph 33 (page 26) raise questions about the authors' conception of how these products differ.

13. *The Role of the NIOs.* This matter is presently under debate, experimentation, and evolution, and the proposal acknowledges that its concepts on this matter may be premature. All that need be said at this point is that many of the references to the NIO's directing, initiating, and drafting role seem at variance with the DCI's emphasis on the staff nature of their function.

Odds and Ends

14. In the list of national consumers, a distinction needs to be made between those consumers who require a continuing flow of national intelligence on the whole spectrum of national security concerns and those with narrower, less continuous, but nonetheless equally real and important requirements. The economic policy people normally will be

in this latter group. They will need special service, and special provision needs to be made for them.

15. It seems odd to assert that there are no established mechanisms or SOPs for producing national intelligence in times of crisis. How is it then that SNIEs get written? The mechanism is that the DCI initiates them, on his own motion or at the request of a consumer or USIB member (and presumably, in the future, at the suggestion of the NIO). The mechanism has worked poorly, but it does exist.

Conclusion

16. The proposal's concern to improve national intelligence is valid. Central direction is essential in this process and should be explicitly vested in the DCI and his representatives. Each of the national intelligence products proposed should be reconsidered in this light.

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/NIO

Herewith a draft comment on the IC Staff recommendations for a "new family" of national intelligence products. This draft rests on your comments to DDI and DD/OCI. May I have any specific suggestions on it ASAP, the response is due to the DDI COB Thursday, 8 November.

Thanks.

DD/OCI

7 Nov 73

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FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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